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The surge of oil prices in recent years has led to speculation that rising transportation costs 
could  end  the  period  of  dramatic  world  trade  growth  —  in  the  words  of  Rubin  (2009), 
“…Your  world  is  going  to  get  a  whole  lot  smaller.”  Using  data  from  China’s  Customs 
Statistics, we examine the impact of oil prices on trade’s sensitivity to distance. We find that 
higher oil prices increase trade’s elasticity to distance, but that the economic effect is small. 
We also find that the effect is more pronounced for trade within global production networks, 
and less large for goods shipped by air.  
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1.  Introduction 
In  the  six  years  leading  up  to  the  global  recession  of  2009-2010,  oil  prices  rose 
dramatically,  from  an  annual  average  of  roughly  US$26  a  barrel  in  2002  to  nearly 
US$100 a barrel in 2008.  In the summer of 2008, prices briefly spiked to nearly US$150 
per barrel before receding as the recession deepened. 
As  oil  prices  surged  upward  in  2008,  business  analysts  became  increasingly  worried 
about the impact of rising oil prices on trade. Rubin and Tal (2008) of CIBC World 
Markets wrote a thought-provoking article that rising oil prices will lead to significant 
hikes  in  international  transportation  costs  and  therefore  to  a  major  slowdown  in  the 
growth of world trade—reversing globalization.
1 They reported that hand-in-hand with 
the oil price hikes, the cost to ship a standard 40-foot container from Shanghai to the U.S. 
eastern seaboard rose from US$3,000 in 2000 to US$8 ,000 in 2008. At such transport 
prices,  they argued,  companies have started to rethink  the establishment of far -flung 
global supply networks, by seeking supplies from domestic and regional markets closer 
to home.  
Following on the heels of  Rubin and Tal (2008),  Jen and Bindelli (2008)  of Morgan 
Stanley Research predicted that East Asia‘s and especially China‘s export model would 
be particularly affected by rising oil prices. This is because trade within East Asia is 
much more vertically specialized than for other regions. Many of the finished goods that 
China exports to America and Europe are made from components imported from Taiwan, 
Japan and South Korea. Since these regional production networks require components to 2 
 
be shipped multiple times, affordable transport costs are an essential ingredient for their 
maintenance. 
Other experts and practitioners, however, have argued that the impact of rising oil prices 
on trade will be relatively limited, and will depend on the type of product (Economist, 
2008; Murphy, 2008). There are more reasons for a company to go global than just cut 
labor cost. The impact of oil prices on offshoring decisions depend on the weight and the 
value  of  the  goods  being  transported,  as  well  as  the  extent  of  other  advantages  like 
quality, responsiveness, and access to local markets  (Murphy, 2008).  
Perhaps surprisingly, academic research on the role of oil price changes on trade has 
remained scant. In this paper, we take advantage of a unique panel data set from China 
Customs Statistics for the period from 1988 to 2008 to investigate the impact of oil prices 
on Chinese trade. The data set is of interest for a number of reasons. First, because this 
dataset distinguishes between ―normal‖ trade and processing trade, we are able to test Jen 
and Bindelli‘s (2008) conjecture that trade within global production networks is more 
sensitive to oil prices than other trade flows. Second, data on transport mode permit us to 
evaluate potential differences in oil price effects for goods with high value-weight ratios 
and  goods  that  are  time  sensitive.  Finally,  since  China  is  among  the  world‘s  largest 
trading nations, our study will allow us to gain new insights into whether rising oil prices 
threaten to have a significant impact on world trade‘s sensitivity to distance. 
We find evidence that China‘s  exports indeed have  become more sensitive to  export 
distance in times of rising oil prices. We also find that these effects are more pronounced 
for processing exports, where goods must cross borders multiple times. On the other 
hand, we find that goods shipped by air are less vulnerable to these effects, consistent 3 
 
with their higher value-to-weight ratio and the relatively greater importance of factors 
other than transportation cost—such as timeliness—for these goods. While these results 
are statistically significant, their economic effects are relatively small. We estimate that 
the  quadrupling  of  oil  prices  between  2002  and  2008  has  increased  the  elasticity  of 
Chinese exports to distance by a mere 5-7%. Our analysis therefore suggests that the 
concerns  of  business  analysts  that  rising  oil  prices  will  significantly  increase  trade‘s 
sensitivity to distance are likely overblown.     
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  we  review  the  literature  and 
develop  our research hypotheses.  In section 3,  we discuss  the data.  In section 4, we 
present our methods. In section 5, we present the results. Section 6 concludes.  
2.  Research hypotheses 
2.1. Oil prices, transport costs and trade 
There has been an enormous expansion in world trade during the past half century. The 
value of world merchandise exports first exceeded $US 1 trillion in 1977, and by 2008 
more than 16 trillion current US dollars of merchandises were exported. During the same 
time period, the share of the world GDP accounted by merchandise trade surged from 
18% to 52%.  
In  addition  to  standard  explanations  that  focus  on  reductions  in  tariff  and  non-tariff 
barriers or rising world income, one candidate explanation for the rapid growth of world 
trade is a trend decline in transportation costs.  Hummels (2007) shows that a substantial 
decline in shipping costs occurred in the post-war period, largely due to technological 
changes.  The decline was most dramatic for air shipping costs, where the cost per ton fell 4 
 
from $3.87 per ton-kilometer in 1955 to under $0.30 by 2004, according to data from the 
International Air Transportation Association.  As Gordon (1990) had observed earlier, the 
drop was particularly sharp in the 1955-72 period, when the jet engine replaced much 
more expensive piston engine aircraft, but costs continued to decline at a 3.5% annual 
rate during the 1972-2003 period  (the rate of decline is somewhat smaller when US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics price index data is used). A decline in waterborne shipping 
prices is less obvious in the raw data, although there is evidence that containerization 
reduced shipping costs significantly below what they would otherwise have been during 
the 1974-2004 period. 
Some now argue that this trend of trade expansion will be reversed in the near future. 
Rubin and Tal (2008) and Rubin (2009) have argued that rising oil prices are likely to 
lead to significant hikes in international transportation  costs and therefore to a major 
slowdown in the growth of world trade. Clearly how large these effects are going forward 
will depend on the extent of future oil price increases, the impact of rising oil prices on 
transport costs, and the sensitivity of trade to these changing costs.   
Oil prices have risen dramatically in the last decade. As shown in Figure 1, while crude 
oil prices in real terms were relatively low from the mid-1980s through the 1990s, they 
increased  rapidly  thereafter,  more  than  tripling  between  2002  and  2008.    Oil  prices 
retreated  sharply  during  the  Global  Recession  of  2008-2009,  but  as  many  expected 
(Adams, 2009), they have since recovered to relatively high levels as global economic 
growth has resumed.   
 [Figure 1 about here] 5 
 
While there is considerable uncertainty about the future path of oil prices, there is a fairly 
broad consensus that prices will rise further in coming years, as limited oil supply meets 
continuing robust growth in energy demand from the developing world.  In fact, a large 
number of oil experts predict that the world will see ―peak oil‖, the maximum level of 
conventional oil output (i.e. excluding heavy oil from tar sands, oil shale etc.), within the 
next decade (De Almeida and Silva, 2009).  Supply responses by oil producers and the 
adoption of alternative energy technology may fill part of the ensuing gap, but in any case 
there will likely be persistent upward pressure on oil prices.  
Table 1 reports oil price forecasts from a number of leading government agencies and 
firms (US Energy Information Agency, 2010).  In the majority of projections, oil prices 
measured in 2008 dollars are expected to exceed $90 per barrel by 2015 and $100 per 
barrel by 2020, with further increases thereafter.  None of the forecasts see oil prices 
returning to the low levels experienced during the 1985-2000 period. 
[Table 1 about here] 
How much will higher oil prices change effective transportation costs? Here the evidence 
is mixed, but some studies have estimated a sensitivity of shipping freight rates to oil 
prices that is relatively low, potentially limiting the threat that rising oil prices will lead to 
a significant reduction in the growth of trade. Hummels (2007) and UNCTAD (2010) 
estimate an elasticity of maritime cargo costs with respect to fuel prices between 0.20 and 
0.40. Mirza and Zitouna (2009) estimate an even lower elasticity of freight rates to oil 
prices ranging from 0.02 to 0.15. Taking Hummels (2007) estimate of 0.20, the near 
quadrupling of oil prices that occurred between 2002 and 2008 (prices rose 282% on an 6 
 
annual  basis)  would  have  raised  shipping  costs  by  56%.  While  perhaps  far  from 
crippling,  clearly there is  likelihood of significantly higher  transport  costs in  coming 
years. 
Given higher transportation costs, the question is to what extent this will reduce trade.  
We will have more to say about this below, when we discuss the differential effects on 
transportation cost on alternative shipping modes.  Rubin and Tal (2008) observe that 
trade growth dropped to zero during the period of high oil prices in 1974-1986, compared 
with the rapid trade expansion of the 1960-1973 and 1987-2002 periods.  While the deep 
global recessions of 1974 and 1981-82 certainly held back trade, they argue that the 
failure of trade to rebound following the recessions was largely due to surging transport 
costs associated with sharply higher oil prices. Looking at more recent experience, they 
estimate that China‘s exports to the U.S. during the 2004-2007 would have been 30% 
higher in the absence of the sharply rising oil prices.
2  
Everything else being equal, the effect of rising oil prices should fall more heavily on 
freight-intensive distant trade rather than proximate trade.  Rubin and Tal (2008) show 
that there was a geographical shift of U.S. trade away from Asia and Europe to Lat in 
America and the Caribbean during the 1974 -1986 period.  This leads us to our first 
testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, a rise in oil prices increases the sensitivity of trade to 
distance. 
This can be assessed using a variant of the standard gravity model of trade, as we will 
discuss below.   7 
 
2.2. Oil prices and the nature of trade 
The nature of world trade has changed significantly in recent years. While for centuries 
manufactured goods trade primarily entailed an exchange of finished products that were 
each produced within a single country, today it increasingly involves the exchange of 
parts  and  components  at  various  stages  of  an  internationally  dispersed  production 
process.
3  Thanks to reductions in tariffs, communication and transport costs, and other 
trade barriers, multinational firms  now often  slice up their supply chains, with bits of 
value added generated in many different locations around the globe . This has led to a 
rapid growth in vertically specialized trade between different nodes of the same global 
production network (GPN) (Feenstra, 1998; Hummels et al., 2001).  
The rise of  GPNs is most evident in  electronics  (Sturgeon, 2002;  Gangnes and  Van 
Assche, 2010). An Apple video iPod, for example, may have its final assembly in China, 
but includes components made in the United States, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
(Linden et al., 2009). But the emergence of GPNs extends well beyond electronics to 
automobiles, toys and many other products. Hummels et al. (2001) found that the import 
content  of  exports  accounted  for  nearly  21%  of  the  exports  of  ten  OECD  and  four 
emerging countries in 1990 and grew almost 30% between 1970 and 1990. Using more 
recent data, Miroudot and Ragoussis (2009) found that the average import content of 
exports has risen from 26% in 1995 to 31% in 2005. 
A  rise  in  oil  prices  may  affect  trade  within  GPNs  differently  from  non-GPN  trade. 
Hummels et al. (2001) and Yi (2003) have argued that intra-GPN trade should be more 
sensitive  than  regular  trade  to  changes  in  tariffs,  transportation  costs  and  other  trade 
barriers,  since  the  fragmentation  of  the  production  process  leads  to  goods  crossing 8 
 
borders  multiple  times.  To  illustrate  this,  consider  Figure  2.  The  left  panel  shows  a 
traditional  trade  pattern  where  a  product  is  entirely  produced  in  country  2  and  then 
exported to country 3 for consumption. The right panel shows a vertically specialized 
trade pattern within a GPN. Country 1 produces inputs and exports them to country 2. 
Country 2 uses the imported inputs to produce a final good. Finally, country 2 exports its 
output to country 3 for consumption. In the latter case, the input produced in country 1 
ends up crossing borders two times, leading to a multiplication of trading costs. Hummels 
et al. (2001) and Yi (2003) introduced this argument as a potential explanation for how 
tariff (and possibly transportation cost) reductions may explain a larger proportion of 
measured trade growth than predicted by traditional trade models. But the converse is 
also  true:  an  increase  in  transportation  costs  could  lead  to  a  magnified  increase  in 
production costs and therefore decrease disproportionately intra-GPN trade. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Using this reasoning, Jen and Bindelli (2008) of Morgan Stanley Research predicted that 
East Asia‘s and especially China‘s export model would be particularly affected by rising 
oil  prices,  since  East  Asian  trade  is  much  more  vertically  specialized  than  for  other 
regions (Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006; Haddad, 2007). As supporting evidence, they 
reported that the share of China‘s exports that are processing exports fell from about 57% 
in late 2001 to 44% in mid-2008, moving in roughly inverse relationship with oil prices. 
This leads to our second hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, a rise in oil prices increases the sensitivity of trade to 
distance more for intra-GPN trade than for regular trade. 9 
 
As we describe further below, we can compare data on Chinese exports from processing 
zones to non-processing exports to evaluate this hypothesis. 
2.3. Oil prices and transport mode 
Oil price changes may also differentially impact trade depending on the types of goods 
that  are  traded.  Two  types  of  goods  in  particular  may  be  less  sensitive  to  oil  price 
changes: goods with a high value-to-weight ratio and goods with a high utility value of 
timely delivery.  These goods are more likely to be shipped by air than is the typical 
good.  
The prevalence of air transport has increased markedly in recent decades.  As a share of 
value, the proportion of US exports shipped by air rose from about 12% in 1965 to nearly 
53% in 2004 (Hummels, 2007).  One reason for this rapid expansion has been a steep 
drop in the relative price of air to ocean shipping, down 40% between 1990 and 2004 
(Harrigan, 2010).   Across the range of manufactured goods, weight-to-value has also 
fallen  (Hummels,  2007),  presumably  reflecting  the  evolving  composition  of  global 
consumption toward, for example, high value electronics goods.  The time sensitivity of 
trade  also  appears  to  have  increased,  perhaps  because  of  the  shift  toward  complex 
manufactures and the need to respond quickly to the increasingly precise and volatile 
product demands of a more affluent global society (Hummels, 2007).   Falling costs per 
unit value and rising utility value of timeliness mean that still-costly air transport can be 
justified for a larger number of goods than in the past.  
The characteristics of goods shipped by air likely make them less sensitive to changes in 
transportation costs than goods shipped by water.  Shipping costs depend primarily on the 10 
 
physical characteristics of a product rather than on its value. As a result, goods with a 
higher value-to-weight  ratio have a lower shipping cost per unit of value (Hummels, 
2007; Harrigan, 2010).  For these goods, an increase in the shipping costs therefore has a 
less  severe  impact  on  total  costs,  making  their  price  less  sensitive  to  transport  cost 
changes.  Similarly,  goods  with  a  high  utility  value  of  time  may  be  less  sensitive  to 
shipping cost  changes  since the importance of timeliness trumps at  least  in  part cost 
considerations (Hummels and Schaur, 2010).  
This allows us to frame our third hypothesis.
4 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, a rise in oil prices increases the sensitivity of trade to 
distance less for products shipped by air than for products shipped by sea. 
3.  Data Description  
To test our hypotheses, we use a unique trade dataset from China‘s Customs Statistics.
5 
This dataset captures all China‘s international trade transactions between 1988 and 2008 
inclusive.  It  records  for  each  flow  of  goods  across  China‘s  border  the  product 
classification, the value and quantity shipped, the year of shipment, the Chinese province 
of  origin  and  the  destination  country  (Feenstra  et  al.,  2004).  In  addition,  it  provides 
information on the customs regime under which an international flow takes place and its 
mode of transportation.  
To test our hypotheses, we take advantage of the panel structure of the international trade 
data  to  investigate  whether  rising  oil  prices  in  the  early  twenty-first  century  have 
rendered China‘s exports more sensitive to distance-related trade costs. Furthermore, as 
we will discuss in this section, we will use information on the customs regime and on the 11 
 
mode of transportation to investigate if the nature of trade and the type of goods play a 
mediating role on the impact of oil prices on trade. 
3.1. Processing trade vs. non-processing trade 
A unique characteristic of our Chinese trade dataset is that it differentiates between trade 
that occurs under China‘s processing trade regime and other (non-processing) trade. This 
differentiation  is  important  since  processing  trade  transactions  unambiguously  reflect 
intra-GPN trade.
6 In the mid-eighties, the Chinese government instituted the processing 
trade regime to entice foreign firms to offshore their production activities to China, while 
protecting the domestic market from foreign competition .  Under this regime, firms 
located in China are granted duty exemptions on imported raw materials and other inputs 
as long as they are used solely for export purposes. Since firms can only use this customs 
regime if they import components for export purposes, processing exports clearly reflect 
intra-GPN trade.  
Four stylized facts highlight the relative size and distinctive nature of China‘s processing 
trade versus non-processing trade. First, as it is shown in figure 3, the share of processing 
exports (i.e. exports conducted under the processing regime) in China's total exports has 
risen from 30% in 1988 to 51% in 2008, while the share of processing imports in total 
imports has  increased  from  27% to  38%.  In other words, more than half of China‘s 
exports are currently intra-GPN trade.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Second, processing exports rely more heavily on imported inputs than non-processing 
exports. In a recent paper, Koopman et al. (2008) combined the China Customs Statistics 12 
 
trade data with an input-output table for China to estimate the domestic content share of 
China‘s processing and non-processing exports. As it is shown in Figure 4, they found 
that,  in  2006,  the  domestic  content  share  of  processing  exports  was  merely  18.1%, 
implying that the value of imported inputs accounted for 81.9% of the processing export 
value. Conversely, the domestic content share of non-processing exports stood at a much 
higher 88.7%, meaning that imported inputs only represented 11.3% of the export value.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
Third, processing exports are predominantly conducted by foreign invested enterprises 
(FIEs),
7 whereas non-processing exports are largely conducted by lo cal firms. Between 
1992 and 2008, the share of processing exports conducted by FIEs has varied from a high 
of 89.7% in 1995 to a low of 71.4% in 2008  (see Figure 5). Conversely, FIEs‘ share of 
non-processing exports has consistently remained below 30%. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Fourth, processing exports are more intensively used in high-technology industries such 
as  electronics.  To  demonstrate  this,  we  have  used  the  Organization  of  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development‘s  (OECD)  technology  classification  (Hatzichronoglou, 
1997)  to  disaggregate  China‘s  exports  into  four  categories:  high  technology  exports, 
medium-high technology exports, medium-low technology exports and low technology 
exports.
8 In Figure 6, we depict the share of processing exports in China‘s total exports 
for each technology category. Tellingly, processing exports are more important in higher 
technology categories than in lower technology categories. In 2008, processing exports 13 
 
accounted  for  80.6%  of  high-technology  exports;  41.9%  of  medium-high-technology 
exports;  28.9%  of  medium-low-technology  exports;  and  24.7%  of  low-technology 
exports.  The  high  prevalence  of  processing  exports  in  high-technology  industries  is 
largely due to electronics companies‘ decisions to offshore their labor-intensive assembly 
operations in China (Gangnes and Van Assche, 2010). In 2008, two thirds of China‘s 
high-technology  goods  exported  under  the  processing  trade  regime  was  electronics 
goods.
9  
[Figure 6 about here] 
These  distinctions  between  processing  trade  and  non-processing  trade  suggest  that 
China‘s foreign trade regime has effectively turned into a dualistic system (Ma and Van 
Assche, 2011). In higher technology industries, foreign firms have on a large scale used 
China‘s  processing  trade  regime  to  integrate  the  country  into  their  GPNs.  In  these 
industries, China heavily relies on imported inputs and is primarily responsible for the 
labor-intensive downstream activities such as assembly. Conversely, in lower technology 
industries, China is relatively uninvolved in GPNs, with its exports largely conducted 
outside the processing trade regime by domestic firms that source their inputs locally. In 
our empirical analysis below, we will assess whether these two types of trade are affected 
differently by oil price increases.  
3.2. Mode of transportation 
Information on the mode of transportation allows us to investigate whether air trade is 
less sensitive to  oil price changes  than ocean trade. To differentiate between air and 
ocean  trade,  we  disaggregate  our  trade  data  into  industries  that  intensively  use  air 14 
 
transport and industries that do not. For this purpose, we use the 2009 trade data from 
China‘s Customs Statistics to calculate for each industry at the 2-digit HS level the share 
of  China‘s  exports  to  nonadjacent  countries  that  is  shipped  by  air.
10  The  results  are 
presented in table 2 (the table only retains the HS 2-digit industries that represent more 
than 1% of the export share in 2008). The table shows that air transport is significantly 
more important for industries that produce goods with a high value-to-weight ratio and 
just-in-time production. Specifically, for electronics industries such as computers (84), 
telecommunications equipment (85) and electronic instruments (90), air transport is an 
important  transport  mode.  Conversely,  products  with  a  low  value-to-weight  ratio 
(apparel,  footwear,  toys,  furniture)  and  bulk  commodities  like  iron  and  steel  and  (of 
course) ships are exported entirely or nearly entirely by sea.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Notice  that  the  air-intensive  industries  are  also  the  industries  that  are  more  heavily 
integrated into global production networks. In Figure 7, we show the share of exports that 
are  in  air-intensive  industries  by  processing  exports  and  non-processing  exports 
respectively. In 2008, more than 65 percent of processing exports were in air-intensive 
industries, while this number was less than 25 percent for non-processing exports.   
[Figure 7 about here] 
4.  Empirical Specification  
Hypothesis 1 states that all else equal, a rise in oil prices increases the sensitivity of trade 
to distance.  To test this, we estimate the following equation for the years 1988-2008: 15 
 
                                                                 .             (1) 
where  the  dependent  variable          is  the  natural  log  of  the  value  of  exports  from 
province i to country j in year t,   is a constant term,      are province-time fixed effects, 
    are destination country fixed effects,         is the natural log of the destination 
country j‘s GDP in year t,       is the average crude oil price in US$/barrel in year t and 
      measures the distance between China and destination country j. Table 3 presents 
descriptive statistics and data sources. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Equation  (1)  is  a  variant  of  the  workhorse  gravity  model  of  trade.
11  Our estimation 
approach takes into account two recent methodological innovations in the gravity model 
literature. Egger (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) and  Anderson (2011) 
have shown that omitting controls for multilateral resistance can create severe biases on 
distance estimates in a gravity setting.
12  They have called for the inclusion of time -
varying origin and destination fixed effects to control for this. In our estimation equation, 
we therefore include province-time fixed effects and country fixed effects.
13 These fixed 
effects imply that our estima tion equation excludes a number of variables that are 
traditionally used in gravity models. For example, the province-time fixed effects capture 
the impact  of any  time-varying variable specific to  a Chinese province, including  its 
respective GDP per capita, population size, real wages, landlocked status and institutional 
features.  Similarly, the country fixed effects capture   the effect of  time non-varying 
country-specific variables such as its size, the degree of home bias and the multilateral 
resistance term.
14 A disadvantage of including these fixed effects is that they  prevent 16 
 
separate  estimation  of  the  coefficients  on  export  distance  (       )  and  oil  prices 
(       ). Since export distance to a given country is similar for all Chinese provinces, 
distance is country-specific in our dataset, and is therefore captured by the country fixed 
effects. Similarly, since oil price changes are identical for all Chinese provinces, their 
effect is captured by the province-time fixed effects. This is not of a great concern since 
our  estimation  equation  still  allows  us  to  investigate  the  relative  impact  of  oil  price 
changes on China‘s trade mediated through distance (with the interaction term          
       ).  In other words,  we  can still investigate  whether, during times of oil prices 
increase,  Chinese  exports  become  more  sensitive  to  distance.  Hypothesis  1  will  be 
supported if    is negative and significant.
15  
Our estimation approach  also deals with a second estimation problem that has recently 
gained attention in the gravity literature. The standard OLS procedure that is traditionally 
used to estimate (1) throws away important information contained in zero trade  flows 
(Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Helpma n  et al., 2008).  Zero  trade flows become 
undefined when converted in logarithms for estimation, creating a sample selection bias. 
To address this issue, we follow Helpman et al. (2008) who propose estimating  a two-
stage model where a Probit equation   is first estimated to   predict whether or not a 
province i exports to a country j in year t. In a second step, equation (1) is then estimated 
in a non-linear OLS specification.
16  
To test hypothesis 2,  we  use the same estimation approach  as in equation (1)  but 
disaggregate China‘s exports according to the customs regime (processing versus non-
processing). We estimate the following equation:  17 
 
                                                                        
                                     .                                                                           (2) 
where the dependent  variable           is  the natural  log of the value of exports from 
province i to country j under customs regime r in year t, and regime is a dummy that 
takes  on  1  if  exports  occur  under  the  processing  trade  regime,  and  0  otherwise. 
Hypothesis 2 implies that    is negative and significant, which suggests that when oil 
prices  rise,  the  increase  in  sensitivity  to  export  distance  is  more  pronounced  for 
processing trade than for non-processing trade. 
To test hypothesis 3, we would like to distinguish between shipment by air and shipment 
by water. Here, we proxy for this difference by including a dummy air that takes on the 
value 1 if in 2009 more than 30% of exports in an HS 2-digit industry occurred by air, 
and 0 otherwise. We then use the following specification: 
                                                                         
                                    .                       (3) 
In this case we add an additional subscript m (for mode), since we now take into account 
whether  trade  is  air-intensive  or  not.  Under  our  hypothesis,  the  coefficient  on      is 
positive:  when  oil  prices  rise,  the  increase  in  sensitivity  to  export  distance  is  less 
pronounced for air-intensive industries than for non-air-intensive industries.  As we noted 
above, this data is available for the year 2009, so this variable does not vary over time.   
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5.  Regression Results 
The results from the estimation of equations (1), (2) and (3) are presented in Tables 4 and 
5. The log of Chinese provincial exports is our dependent variable and each specification 
includes province-time fixed effects and country fixed effects (not reported because of 
space constraints). To account for zeros, all coefficients are estimated using the two-stage 
procedure developed by Helpman et al. (2008). In all equations we compute standard 
errors that are robust to clustered heteroscedasticity (White, 1980).  
Column (1) of Table 4 reports coefficient estimates without controlling for the type of 
trade. The coefficient on oil price*export distance is negative and significant, providing 
support for Hypothesis 1. In other words, a rise in oil prices increases the sensitivity of 
China‘s exports to distance.  
In column (2) of Table 4, we interact the dummy regime with oil price*export distance to 
test whether oil prices affect trade‘s sensitivity to distance differently depending on the 
type  of  trade.  We  find  that  the  coefficients  on  both  oil  price*export  distance  and 
regime*oil price*export distance are negative and significant, suggesting that a rise in oil 
prices increases the sensitivity of China‘s processing exports to distance more than for 
non-processing exports. 
 [Table 4 about here] 
In Table 5, we interact the dummy variable air with oil price*export distance to test 
whether oil prices affect trade‘s sensitivity to distance differently depending on the mode 
of  transport.  Column  (1)  shows  the  coefficient  estimates  when  our  sample  is  pooled 
across both processing and non-processing exports, while columns (2) and (3) show the 19 
 
results for processing and non-processing exports, respectively. The results are in line 
with hypothesis 3. In all three columns, the coefficient on oil price*export distance is 
negative and significant, while the coefficient on air*oil price*export distance is positive 
and  significant.  This  suggests  that  a  rise  in  oil  prices  makes  China‘s  exports  more 
sensitive to distance, but less so for trade by air. 
[Table 5 about here] 
How large are these effects?  One way to assess this is to consider the implied increase in 
distance effects  for the  oil price changes that have  occurred in  recent  years.  At the 
roughly US$26 per barrel price of 2002, the combined coefficient on log distance in 
Table 4 column (1) is approximately -0.043*ln(26)  = -0.14.  After nearly quadrupling to 
about US$100 in 2008, the combined coefficient is roughly -0.043*ln(100) = -0.20. This 
suggests that the dramatic oil price rise between 2002 and 2008 has increased the distance 
elasticity of exports by 0.06 percentage points. Distance coefficients from similar gravity 
models typically range from 0.9 to 1.1 (Disdier and Head, 2008), so that our result would 
suggest an increase in distance elasticity of about 5.5-6.7%. These strike us as relatively 
small, challenging Rubin and Tal‘s (2008) argument that rising oil prices will make trade 
substantially more sensitive to distance.   
In Table 6, we estimate the differential impact of a hypothetical increase in oil prices 
from  US$26  to  US$100  depending  on  the  type  of  trade  (processing  versus  non-
processing)  and  the  mode  of  transport  (air-intensive  versus  non-air-intensive).  The 
appendix presents the complete calculation. Using the estimated coefficients in columns 
(2) and (3) of Table 5, the oil price increase would have a negligible impact on the 20 
 
sensitivity of air-intensive exports to distance. In air-intensive industries, the distance 
elasticity would in absolute value rise by 0.02 and 0.03 percentage points for processing 
and  non-processing  exports,  respectively.  In  non-air-intensive  industries,  the  effect  is 
larger. For processing exports, the distance elasticity would in absolute value rise by 0.13 
percentage points, while for non-processing exports it would increase by 0.09 percentage 
points. This would correspond to an increase in the distance elasticity of approximately 
10% for non-air-intensive trade.     
[Table 6 about here] 
The relatively small impact of oil price changes on trade‘s elasticity to distance should 
not be entirely surprising to international business scholars. An influential literature in 
international  business  has  highlighted  that  international  business  strategy  is  regional 
rather than global, and that this is largely due to factors other than transportation costs 
(Ghemawat, 2003; Buckley and Ghauri, 2004; Ricart et al., 2004; Rugman and Verbeke, 
2004, 2007). 
In  conclusion,  we  find  evidence  supporting  the  hypothesis  that  China‘s  exports  have 
become more sensitive to distance in times of rising oil prices. The size of the impact, 
however, depends on the type of trade and the mode of transport. Processing exports have 
seen a larger increase in their sensitivity to distance during times of rising oil prices than 
non-processing  exports.  Conversely,  exports  in  air-intensive  industries  have  seen  a 
smaller  increase  in  their  sensitivity  to  distance  during  times  of  rising  oil  prices  than 
exports in ocean-intensive industries. While these results are statistically significant, their 
economic  effects  are  relatively  small.  Our  analysis  therefore  finds  that  concerns  of 21 
 
business analysts that rising oil prices will increase substantially trade‘s sensitivity to 
distance are likely overblown.  
6.  Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have taken up the question of whether higher oil prices may mean a 
substantial  reduction  in  global  trade,  particularly  within  global  production  networks.  
Using a unique dataset of Chinese trade, which distinguishes between processing and 
other trade, we estimate variants of the gravity model of trade that incorporate oil price 
effects.  We find that there is a significant effect of oil prices on the relationship between 
exports  and  distance:  higher  oil  prices  make  distance  a  bigger  barrier  to  trade.  As 
expected, these effects are larger for processing trade than for non-processing trade, since 
vertically specialized trade requires goods to cross borders multiple times.  In addition, 
we find that exports shipped by air are less sensitive to oil prices than exports shipped by 
ocean, consistent with their higher weight-to-value ratio and their greater dependence on 
considerations such as timeliness that may outweigh transport costs.  
That oil prices matter is not surprising.  Perhaps the more important question is what the 
magnitudes of these effects are.  We find effects that appear small, although it is harder to 
make an intuitive judgment as to whether these might be viewed by firms as qualitatively 
important.  Our  estimates  suggest  that  the  quadrupling  of  oil  prices  from  an  annual 
average of US$26 in 2002 to nearly US$100 a barrel in 2008 would increase trade‘s 
elasticity to distance by a mere 5.5-6.7%. 
There are important limitations to this study that arise from the nature of the available 
data and the empirical specification that we have employed.  The limited variability of oil 22 
 
prices over the 1988-2008 period—they were largely flat in real terms for the first half of 
the sample before surging upward—means that it may be difficult to precisely estimate 
oil price effects. Another limitation of our analysis is that it may be difficult to separate 
the influence of oil prices from other time-varying factors that may have trended upward 
in the early twenty first century. For example, if over the past decade the adoption of just-
in-time production techniques has become more pronounced, this may have led firms to 
source  products  from  nearby  countries,  regardless  of  changes  in  transportation  costs 
(Evans  and  Harrigan,  2005).  Our  analysis  partially  controls  for  this  by  making 
distinctions between types of trade and modes of transport, but more work needs to be 
done  to  further  disentangle  these  effects.  Finally,  our  specification  imposes  constant 
elasticities  of  the  distance  effect  with  respect  to  oil  prices.    This  may  not  be  an 
appropriate assumption.  Hummels (2007), for example, notes that the gains from air 
transport are larger for long distances than for shorter ones.  This suggests that the impact 
of higher oil prices may not alter export behavior in a linear fashion.  
It seems unlikely that the dire predictions of the ―end of globalization‖ will come to pass, 
at  least  assuming  that  oil  prices  rise  only  moderately  from  current  high  levels,  as 
expected by most forecasting agencies.  Differences in factor endowments remain very 
large,  and  technological  change  will  provide  ways  to  offset  some  of  the  future  cost 
increases.    But  it  is  nevertheless  likely  that  the  expansion  of  global  trade  will  be 
restrained by high energy costs, compared with its rapid expansion in recent decades.  
Considering the paucity of existing literature, this should be a fruitful area for research in 
coming years.   
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Appendix 
In this appendix, we calculate the impact of a hypothetical increase in oil prices from 
US$26  to  US$100  on  the  elasticity  of  Chinese  exports  to  distance,  by  type  of  trade 
(processing versus non-processing) and mode of transportation (air-intensive versus sea-
intensive). We report these results in Table 6. 
First, we use the estimated coefficients in column (2) of Table 5 to measure the impact of 
the oil price increase on non-air-intensive processing exports. Since the dummy variable 
air equals 0 for non-air-intensive exports, the combined coefficient on log distance at an 
oil price of US$26 is -0.094*ln(26)+0*0.079*ln(26)= -0.30.  At US$100, the combined 
coefficient changes to -0.094*ln(100)+0*0.079*ln(100)= -0.43. This suggests that an oil 
price surge from US$26 to US$100 increases the distance elasticity of non-air-intensive 
processing exports by 0.13 percentage points.  
Next, we use the estimated coefficients in column (2) of Table 5 to measure the impact of 
the oil price rise on the distance elasticity of air-intensive processing exports. In this case, 
the dummy variable air equals to 1. As a result, the combined coefficient on log distance 
at an oil price of US$26 is -0.094*ln(26) + 1*0.079*ln(26)  = -0.05.  At US$100, the 
combined coefficient changes to -0.094*ln(100) + 1*0.079*ln(100)  = -0.07. This implies 
that an oil price increase from US$26 to US$100 increases the distance elasticity of air-
intensive processing exports by 0.02 percentage points. 
By using the coefficients in column (3) of Table 5 and the same steps as above, it is 
straightforward  to also measure the impact on non-air-intensive ordinary exports and air-
intensive ordinary exports.     27 
 
Figure 1: Average real crude oil prices, 2009US$/barrel, 1980-2010 
     
  Source: Authors calculations based on data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis and US Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Oil price is the spot price of West Texas 
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Figure 3: Proportion of processing trade in China’s total trade, 1988-2008 
 
Source: Authors‘ calculations using China‘s Customs Statistics. 
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Figure 4: Domestic and foreign content share of China’s processing and non-
processing exports 
   
Source: Koopman et al. (2008).  




















Figure 5: Share of China’s exports conducted by foreign-invested enterprises, 1988-
2008 
 
Source: authors‘ calculations, using China‘s Customs Statistics. 












processing exports non-processing exports32 
 
Figure 6: Share of processing exports in China’s total exports, by technology level 
(%), 1992-2008.  
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Figure 7: Share of exports in air-intensive industries (%), by customs regime,  
1988-2008 
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Table 1.  Projections of World Real Oil Prices (2008 US$ per barrel), 2015-2035 
  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035 
USEIA 2010 (Reference)  94.52  108.28  115.09  123.50  133.32 
INFORUM  92.50  107.98  109.74  116.81  -- 
DB  93.18  105.48  114.65  121.16  125.42 
IHSGI  85.07  81.93  74.86  77.27  80.03 
IEA (Reference)  --  100.00  --  115.00  -- 
EVA  80.35  84.45  90.98  100.43  -- 
SEER (Business as Usual)  79.20  74.31  69.73  65.43  -- 
SEER (Multi-Dimensional)  99.03  101.52  105.81  113.91  -- 
Source: "Comparison with other projections", from Annual Energy Outlook 2010,  US Energy 
Information Agency.  Organizations listed are Interindustry Forecasting Project at the Univer- 
sity of Maryland (INFORUM), Deutsche Bank (DB), IHS Global Insight (IHSGI), the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Ventures Analysis, Inc. (EVA), and Strategic Energy & Economic 
Research, Inc. (SEER). 
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Table 2. Proportion of exports shipped by air, major exporting industries 
HS2 
code 
  Share of total exports   Exports by 
air, % of 
total 2009    1988  1998  2008 
85  Electrical machinery & equipment & parts, telecommunications 
equipment, sound recorders, television recorders  4.10  22.56  33.50  33.84 
84  Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery & mechanical appliances, 
computers  3.00  12.69  28.04  33.03 
90  Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, 
precision, medical or surgical instruments & accessories  0.42  3.40  3.96  29.83 
29  Organic chemicals  3.73  0.54  1.01  11.78 
62  Articles of apparel & clothing accessories – not knitted or crocheted  18.62  8.33  2.54  9.62 
61  Articles of apparel & clothing accessories, knitted and crocheted  2.47  4.02  1.15  7.44 
39  Plastics & articles thereof  1.55  3.77  2.64  1.99 
87  Vehicles other and railway or tramway rolling stock  0.71  1.34  1.80  1.35 
64  Footwear, gaiters and the like  3.63  5.63  1.79  1.12 
40  Rubbers & articles thereof  2.03  0.73  1.94  0.97 
86  Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock, track fixtures & 
fittings, signals  0.01  1.67  1.36  0.88 
95  Toys, games and sports equipment, parts & accessories  2.46  5.96  2.60  0.81 
94  Furniture, bedding, cushions, lamps & lighting fittings nesoi, 
illuminated signs, nameplates & the like, prefabricated buildings  1.51  2.27  2.06  0.65 
89  Ships, boats, & floating structures  1.44  1.74  3.13  0.01 
Authors‘ calculations using China‘s Customs Statistics Data 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources 
    Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min.  Max.  Data source 
Exports (US$ million)  (1)  13.485  2.861  0.693  24.395  China Customs Statistics 
Oil Price (US$/barrel)  (2)  3.365  0.559  2.644  4.585  International Financial Statistics 
GDP (US$)  (3)  24.412  2.233  17.162  30.285  World Economic Outlook 
Export Distance (km)  (4)  8.458  0.666  4.236  9.413  Lin (2005) 
Processing  (5)  0.358  0.479  0.000  1.000  China Customs Statistics 
Air  (6)  0.415  0.493  0.000  1.000  China Customs Statistics 
Note: Other than dummies, all variables are in natural logarithms. 
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Table 4.  Panel regressions: effect of oil prices on export sensitivity to distance, total 
and processing trade 
                        Regression results, 1988-2008 
Dependent variable  Log of bilateral exports 
  (1)  (2) 
GDP  0.769***  0.826*** 
  [0.023]  [0.021] 
Oil Price * Export 
Distance  -0.043***  -0.036*** 
  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Processing    -1.289*** 




  -0.013*** 
    [0.002] 
Year*Province 
Dummy  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummy  Yes  Yes 
Observations  115,159  115,159 
R-squared  0.680  0.752 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * means significant at 10%; ** means significant at 5%; 
*** means significant at 1%. Coefficients on constant term, on fixed effects and on the first stage not 
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Table 5. Panel regressions: effect of oil prices on export sensitivity to distance, 
shipments by air and by surface transport  
Regression results, 1988-2008 
  Log of bilateral 
total exports 
Log of bilateral processing 
exports 
Log of bilateral ordinary 
exports 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
GDP  0.719***  0.732***  0.786*** 
  [0.018]  [0.030]  [0.021] 
Oil Price * Export Distance  -0.075***  -0.094***  -0.064*** 
  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.002] 
Air  -2.815***  -3.100***  -2.979*** 
  [0.045]  [0.073]  [0.049] 
Air*Oil Price* Export Distance  0.049***  0.079***  0.037*** 
  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.002] 
Year*Province Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  190,579  68,689  121,890 
R-squared  0.645  0.677  0.744 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * means significant at 10%; ** means significant at 5%; 
*** means significant at 1%. Coefficients on constant term and on fixed effects not reported. Other than 
dummies, all variables are in natural logarithms. 
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Table 6. Percentage point change in the elasticity of exports to distance if oil prices 
rises from US$26 to US$100, by type of trade and transport mode. 
  Processing exports  Non-processing exports 
Air-intensive exports  -0.02  -0.04 
Non-air intensive exports  -0.13  -0.09 
Source: Authors‘ calculations 
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End Notes 
                                                           
1 Rubin (2009) expanded on this argument in his award-winning book Why Your World Is Going to Get a 
Whole Lot Smaller: Oil and the End of Globalization. The title of our paper refers to this book. 
2 Existing research on the effects of overall transportation costs on trade volume does not provide a clear 
result, perhaps because of a wide variety of empirical approaches and specifications.   Some papers appear 
to find large effects of transport costs on trade.  Limao and Venables (2001) find that a doubling of 
transport costs would reduce trade by 45%. Radelet and Sachs (1998) conclude that an increase in the 
CIF/FOB band from 12% to 17% would reduce the long-term annual growth rate of non-primary 
manufactured exports by 0.2 percentage points of GDP.   On the other hand, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) 
find that transportation cost changes explain only 8% of the growth in world trade in the post-World War II 
period.  And Rose (1991) does not find that transportation costs have a statistically significant effect on 
global trade growth in the 1951-81 period.  
3 Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) have eloquently described this a shift from trade in goods to trade 
in tasks.  
4 In principle one could directly assess the effect of the value-to-weight ratio and utility value of timely 
delivery on the sensitivity of trade to oil price changes, but reliable data are difficult to come by. 
5 In order to estimate the ultimate destination country of Chinese exports that are re-exported through Hong 
Kong, we link the Chinese trade data to a data set from the Hong Kong Census and Statistical Office on 
Hong Kong re-exports. See Ma et al. (2009) for more details. 
6 As Ma and Van Assche (2010) explain, the data set on China‘s processing trade regime is one of only a 
few data sources that allow us to gain insights into the nature of vertically specialized trade.    
7 Foreign-invested enterprises include wholly foreign-owned enterprises, Sino-foreign contractual joint 
ventures with more than 25% foreign ownership, and Sino-foreign equity joint ventures with more than 
25% foreign ownership. Note that in China‘s Customs Statistics, companies from Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan are considered foreign firms.   
8 High-technology industries include aerospace, pharmaceuticals, office and computing machinery, radio, 
TV and communication equipment and medical, precision and optical instruments. 
9 We broadly define electronics as the HS 2-digit codes 84, 85 and 90. 
10 We only have access to data on the mode of transportation for the year 2009. 
11 See Fratianni et al. (forthcoming) for a discussion of the gravity equation in international business 
research. 
12 The multilateral resistance term takes into account that bilateral trade flows not only depend on the 
bilateral trade costs between the home and host country, but also on the average trade costs across all other 
countries. 
13 We do not include country-time fixed effects since this would not allow us to estimate the impact of oil 
price changes on trade‘s sensitivity to distance. 
14 Our specification also does not include bilateral variables such as common colony, common border and 
common language. These variables do not vary across Chinese provinces, thus making them country-
specific.  
15 The estimation results may be affected by the potential non-stationarity of some variables.  Although 
spurious regression problems are of less concern in panel settings than in standard time-series analysis, 
because the fixed effects estimator for non-stationary data is asymptotically normal, there will be bias in 
small samples (Fidrmuc, 2009; Kao and Chiang, 2000).  There remain very few papers that analyze the 
effect of non-stationarity in panel gravity model settings, including Faruqee (2004) and Gengenbach 
(2009).  On the basis of Monte Carlo analysis, Fidrmuc (2009) concludes that the potential bias from use of 
fixed effects models appears to be relatively small.   
16 Similar to Helpman et al. (2008), the first-stage regression includes province, country, and year fixed 
effects. To ensure that we do not need to rely on the normality assumption for the unobserved trade costs, 
we also include the following excluded variable: a dummy that equals to 1 if both the province and the 
country have a coast.  Step 1 regressions are not reported here. 